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Preemption of Reconcilable State Regulation: Federal
Benefit Schemes v. State Marital Property Law
Since Gibbons v. Ogden,' the United States Supreme Court has ex-
tensively utilized the doctrine of federal preemption to determine the
validity of state law in the face of arguably conflicting federal legisla-
tion. Federal preemption invalidates state regulation which conflicts or
interferes with federal regulation.2 Given the requisite conflict, the
principle of federal supremacy applies despite both the existence of im-
portant state interests in the preempted regulation3 and the failure of
Congress to adequately assess the preemptive capability of the overrid-
ing federal regulation. 4 The Court has consistently invoked federal
preemption without undertaking the process of federalism balancing
common to other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.5
The failure to consider relative state and federal interests may be
acceptable when applying orthodox preemption doctrine to state and
federal regulation aimed at similar objectives. The same failure, how-
ever, may result in erroneous and unintended shifts in regulatory
power when the federal and state laws in question are enacted in con-
templation of unrelated objectives. 6
The problems inherent in applying orthodox preemption doctrine
to unrelated federal and state regulation are evident in three recent
Burger Court decisions invalidating state marital property laws. In
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo ,7 McCarty v. McCarty8 and Ridgway v. Ridg-
way,9 the Court invalidated state marital property laws as applied to
the receipt of federal retirement and insurance benefits. Because these
cases involved reconcilable federal and state regulation aimed at unre-
lated objectives, it can be argued that the Burger Court failed to apply
suitable standards in determining that the state marital property laws
1. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981).
3. See infra text accompanying note 127.
4. See infra notes 75-77 & accompanying text.
5. For example, in dormant commerce clause cases "[t]he Court employs a balancing
standard which weighs the state interest advanced by the challenged regulation against the
national interest in open boundaries to commerce." Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the
Burger Court: California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. RFv. 3,
12-13 (1979).
6. See infra notes 75-77 & accompanying text.
7. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
8. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
9. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
[685]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
were preempted. Moreover, the arguments favoring adoption of a new
preemption standard in state marital property law cases are equally ap-
plicable to preemption disputes involving many other types of state and
federal regulation.
This Comment examines federal preemption of reconcilable state
laws enacted to accomplish goals unrelated to the goals underlying fed-
eral law. The suitability of orthodox preemption doctrine in this con-
text is examined with reference to the Burger Court's application of
federal preemption to state marital property law. First, the Comment
summarizes basic preemption principles ("orthodox preemption doc-
trine") developed by the Court since Gibbons. The Comment then ex-
amines the preemption standard applied by the Burger Court in
Hisquierdo, McCarty and Ridgway and argues that it is not suited to
resolve preemption disputes between reconcilable regulation aimed at
differing objectives. Finally, the Comment suggests an alternative to
the preemption standard presently applied to state regulation of marital
property or other types of state regulation undertaken to achieve goals
different from those underlying preempting federal regulation.
Orthodox Preemption Doctrine
The United States Constitution states the important principle of
federal supremacy: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ." The
supremacy clause mandates preemption of state laws which conflict
with the congressional exercise of an enumerated power.
When the requisite preemptive relationship exists, state regulation
is invalidated without reference to the federal or state interests at stake.
Although the policy considerations underlying arguably conflicting
federal and state regulation may be entirely different in nature and im-
portance,"l the Court has appeared unwilling to adopt a balancing ap-
proach in applying orthodox preemption doctrine.12 Thus, the validity
of challenged state regulation traditionally has hinged solely on the
existence of a perceived conflict with valid federal regulation.
Generally, preemption case law can be segregated into two rela-
tively distinct classifications. First, congressional action may evidence
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See infra notes 163-68 & accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (quoting Free v. Bland, 396
U.S. 663, 666 (1962)) ("[T]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law .. "). However, in Farmer v. Carpenters,
430 U.S. 290 (1977), a strong state interest was the basis for upholding a state tort action
which posed some risk of interfering with federal labor law. The Court stated that "in light
of the discrete concerns of the federal scheme and the state tort law, [the] potential for inter-
ference is insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the State in
protecting its citizens." Id. at 304.
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an intent to "occupy the field".1 3 When a field of regulation is deemed
to be federally occupied, any state law attempting to operate within
that field is necessarily preempted, whether or not it actually interferes
with the operation of existing federal legislation. For example, exten-
sive federal involvement in the field of aircraft regulation may be the
basis for preempting local curfews on commercial flights despite the
absence of federal legislation prohibiting curfews.14
Second, state laws may "conflict" or "interfere" with the letter or
spirit of valid federal enactments. 15 For example, in one such preemp-
tion dispute the Court held that federal homestead legislation, specify-
ing the terms under which certain designated individuals could succeed
to the rights of the deceased homesteader, preempted a state commu-
nity property claim to succession by the homesteader's daughter. 16
Occupying The Field
State laws may be invalidated merely because they are found to
operate in an area "occupied" by federal regulation. Federal regula-
tion will not be found to occupy a field "unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."' 7 This congressional mandate is recog-
nized whenever enforcement of state law would impair "federal super-
intendence of the field."'18
Application of this test is difficult for a variety of reasons. Con-
gress often gives no clear indication whether its enactments are in-
tended to occupy a particular field.' 9 Further, evidence of
congressional intent is normally discovered in the legislative history, an
13. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See, e.g., Central Machinery
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (federal "Indian Trader" statutes
preempt state law imposing tax on sale consumated on reservation).
14. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See also,
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (federal anti-sedition legislation embodied in
the Smith Act held so pervasive that Pennsylvania sedition statute apparently supplementing
federal law was preempted); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (Pennsylvania alien
registration law requiring all aliens to carry state registration card held preempted by Fed-
eral Alien Registration Act which did not require aliens to carry registration cards).
15. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525-26 (1977) ("Congressional enactments
that do not exclude all state legislation in the same field nevertheless override state laws with
which they conflict.").
16. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
17. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
18. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
19. "By framing the pre-emption question in terms of specific congressional intent the
Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for itself. . . . In the great majority of cases
the pre-emptive implications of the federal statute must be derived without the aid of spe-
cific legislative guidance, and even when such guidance is offered, it does not represent the
whole solution in many instances." Comment, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground- A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 209-10 (1959). See also, Hirsch, Toward a
New View ofFederal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 542.
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often misleading and unreliable source. 20
Because of these difficulties, the Court occasionally looks to cer-
tain extrinsic factors to ascertain whether Congress intended to occupy
a field.21 One or more extrinsic factors may be the basis for finding that
Congress, by its regulation, intended to occupy the field to the exclu-
sion of state law. 22
Conflict or Interference
If a state law operates outside an occupied field, it will not be in-
validated on the basis of the supremacy clause unless it is in conflict
with existing valid federal regulation.
In Perez v. Campbell,23 the Court stated: "Deciding whether a state
statute is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the
Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining
the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitu-
20. "Because of the propensity of many legislators to manufacture legislative history,
the courts tend to discount statements made on the floor of Congress." Comment, supra
note 19, at 215.
21. One extrinsic factor may be the importance of national uniformity in the regulated
field. Eg., Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (uniform-
ity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act as the basis for pre-
empting state law action against carrier for abandonment of railroad branch line). Another
extrinsic factor may be the pervasive character of federal regulation in the field. E.g., City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) ("It is the pervasive
nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that
there is pre-emption."). A third extrinsic factor may be the relation of this field to a domi-
nant or uniquely federal interest. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state re-
quirement that aliens carry state issued registration card impermissibly infringed upon
federal superintendance of international relations). A fourth extrinsic factor may be the
degree to which state law can be characterized as regulating a matter of traditional state
concern. E.g, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("Where, as here, the
field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the
States . . . 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.' [citation omitted]"). Finally, the Court may be influenced by the degree to which
the objectives of state and federal law differ. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (New York Stock Exchange compulsory arbitration re-
quirement promulgated as a self-regulation measure held not to preempt state law remedies
designed to protect wage earners from economic pressures affecting the employment rela-
tionship); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (municipal
smoke abatement ordinance designed to protect health not preempted by federal inspection
laws aimed at protecting against maritime navigation perils). But see Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test of whether both federal and
state regulations may operate. . . is whether both regulations can be enforced without im-
pairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or
different objectives.").
22. See cases cited supra note 21.
23. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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tional question whether they are in conflict." 24
In the first stage of conflict/interference preemption analysis, the
Court interprets the relevant state and federal laws in question. With
respect to a federal law, the purposes, objectives and scope of the legis-
lation must be ascertained. Next, the operation of the state law is de-
termined. The groundwork is thus laid for deciding the constitutional
issue whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 25
The purposes, objectives and scope of the federal legislation is de-
termined in the same manner as occupation of a field--Congressional
intent is the yardstick.26 What Congress intended, however, is seldom
clear.27
In the typical case the Court faces the construction problem with
only its "own predilections regarding the proper relation between fed-
eral and state governments and [its] own notions on the proper method
of statutory interpretation." 28 This subjectivity manifests itself in one
important way: statutory construction determining the purposes, objec-
tives and scope of federal legislation can be liberal or strict.29 The free-
dom to construe liberally or strictly is the freedom to create or avoid
constitutional conflicts.
The significance of the interpretation process can be better appre-
ciated by an examination of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Wissner v. Wissner.30 In Wissner, a serviceman's widow claimed one-
half ownership of the proceeds of his National Service Life Insurance
policy.31 Prior to his death, the serviceman had designated his parents
as beneficiaries.32 Under California law, insurance proceeds are con-
sidered community property33 if the policy is purchased with commu-
nity property.34 The California court of appeal found that the policy
24. Id. at 644.
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
26. Hirsch, supra note 19, at 542.
27. See supra notes 19-20 & accompanying text.
28. Hirsch, supra note 19, at 536.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 30-49.
30. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
31. Id. at 657.
32. Id.
33. Community property law "'proceeds upon the theory that the marriage, in respect
to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member,
equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to
succeed to the property after dissolution'. ... Community property includes the property
earned by either spouse during the union, as well as that given to both during the mar-
riage.... In community property States, ownership turns on the method and timing of
acquisition, while the traditional view in common-law States is that ownership depends on
title." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1979) (quoting Meyer v. Kinzer, 12
Cal. 247, 251 (1859)) (footnotes omitted).
34. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 657-58. Although under California law the wife's right to a
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was purchased with community property,35 and allowed the widow's
claim.
36
In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of
the National Service Life Insurance Act of 194037 preempted the
widow's state law claim. 38 Under the Act, each insured has "the right
to designate the beneficiary" of the policy, 39 and payments therefrom
are "exempt from the claims of creditors" and not subject to "attach-
ment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process
whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary."'4 Thus, the
majority4' concluded that "Congress [had] spoken with force and clar-
ity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and
no other."'42
The three dissenting Justices, 43 disagreeing with the majority's in-
terpretation of the relevant federal statutes, wrote that "the right to des-
ignate [the] beneficiary" did not foreclose the former wife's claim as
part owner of the policy44 because "the wife [made] no claim to rights
as a beneficiary." 45 The dissent further concluded that the provision
exempting the proceeds from the claims of creditors did not preempt
the wife's state claim.46 "Creditor," as used in the federal statute,
meant one who attempted to reach the fund on an independent claim. 47
The dissenters reasoned that the federal statute presupposed that the
beneficiary was the undisputed owner of the insurance proceeds. 48
Thus, the wife's claim as a part owner did not conflict with the federal
statute so as to warrant preemption.49
portion of the insurance proceeds necessarily followed from a finding that the serviceman's
policy was purchased with community property funds, the Court found it "unnecessary to
decide whether California is entitled to call army pay community property." Id. at 657 n.2.
See generally Davis, The Case of the Missing Community Property, 5 Sw. L.J. 1 (1951).
35. The policy had been purchased with the husband's military pay while he was mar-
ried. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 657. See supra note 33.
36. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 658-61.
37. Ch. 757, §§ 601-618, 54 Stat. 1008-14 (1940) (current version at 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-
725 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
38. 338 U.S. at 658-61.
39. National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 601(g), 54 Stat. 1008, 1010
(1940) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976)).
40. Pub. L. No. 262, § 3, 49 Stat. 607, 609 (1935) made applicable to the National Serv-
ice Life Insurance Act of 1940 by ch. 757, § 616, 54 Stat. 1014 (1940).
41. Justice Clark joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Black and Burton.
42. 338 U.S. at 658.
43. Justice Minton joined by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson.
44. 338 U.S. at 662-63 (Minton, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 663.
46. Id. at 663-64.
47. Id. at 662.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 662-63.
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Wissner demonstrates the Court's traditional willingness to apply
preemption doctrine to reconcilable state regulation. The dissenting
Justices found preemption inapplicable because they narrowly con-
strued the scope of the federal legislation. Conversely, the majority's
liberal statutory interpretation precluded an otherwise valid applica-
tion of state community property law from dividing a federally related
marital asset.
The process of statutory construction illustrated in Wissner is only
the first step in the Court's conflict/interference preemption analysis.
The Court must also determine whether the relationship between the
federal and state statutes warrants invoking the supremacy clause.50
The requisite preemptive relationship can take two forms. First,
federal and state law can "conflict" so as to be "irreconcilable."' 5' Such
a relationship would exist, for example, where state law mandates con-
duct which federal law proscribes.52 State law in this case would stand
as a complete "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. '53
State and federal laws, however, are rarely irreconcilable. Thus,
much depends on statutory construction in the first instance. The rea-
soning of the dissenters in Wissner, for example, illustrates the process
of statutory reconciliation at work. True conflict preemption disputes
are seldom encountered.5 4 Instead, the Court encounters preemptive
relationships spanning the continuum from irreconcilability to irrele-
vance. Many cases lie somewhere in between. These are the so-called
"interference" cases.55 They involve state laws which inhibit rather
50. See supra notes 23-25 & accompanying text.
51. There is little agreement among commentators as to which labels most accurately
describe the preemptive relationship. One commentator divides the nomenclature of con-
ffict/interference case law as follows: 1) conflict, irreconcilability, contrary to, violation; and
2) interference, difference, inconsistency, curtailment. Hirsch, supra note 19, at 526. An-
other commentator divides conflict/interference preemption into two different classifica-
tions: 1) inconsistency conflicts; and 2) obstacle conflicts. Wiggins, supra note 5, at 42-44.
The term "irreconcilable" is utilized in this Comment to describe conflict/interference pre-
emption disputes in which the only reasonable interpretation of the relevant state and fed-
eral laws leads to the conclusion that the primary purpose of the federal law is completely
defeated by the existence of the state law.
52. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963) ("That
would be the situation here if, for example, the federal orders forbade the picking and mar-
keting of any avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the
State any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content.").
53. See supra note 29 & accompanying text.
54. "[Cases of explicit conflict are rare. Far more frequently, the Court must imply a
conflict. . . ." Wiggins, supra note 5, at 43.
55. The term "interference" is utilized in this Comment to describe con-
flict/interference preemption disputes in which a reasonable interpretation of the relevant
state and federal laws may leave the primary objective of the federal law substantially un-
hindered by the continued existence of the state law. See supra note 5 1.
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than prevent "the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. '56 Typically, orthodox preemption analy-
sis must be used to determine the validity of state laws which are
merely "inconsistent" as opposed to "irreconcilable" with federal
legislation.5 7
Free v. Bland58 exemplifies the use of orthodox preemption analy-
sis to invalidate a state marital property law which "interferes" with the
purposes and objectives of federal law. Free illustrates that while the
preemptive relationship may be characterized as "interference", as op-
posed to "irreconcilable", the obligation to invoke federal supremacy
does not vary under orthodox preemption doctrine.
In Free, the husband purchased United States Savings Bonds is-
sued to "Mr. or Mrs. Free."' 59 Treasury regulations governing bonds
issued in that form provide that a surviving co-owner will be "recog-
nized as the sole and absolute owner." 60 After the death of Mrs. Free,
her son claimed part ownership in the bonds pursuant to Texas com-
munity property law. 61 The Texas courts ultimately awarded full title
to the bonds to Mr. Free but ordered that he reimburse the son for one-
half the value of the bonds.62
A unanimous Supreme Court concluded that application of Texas
community property law frustrated the purpose and objective of the
federal borrowing scheme.63 First, the Court found that the Treasury
regulations in question were promulgated under the federal borrowing
power and were therefore valid.64 Second, the Court held that the leg-
islative history clearly indicated that the purpose of the regulations was
"to establish the right of survivorship regardless of local state law." 65
Because Congress had sought to regulate the right of survivorship, the
state court's reimbursement order could not be saved by the award of
full title to Mr. Free.66 The Treasury chose the survivorship provision
as an inducement to attract bond purchasers.67 The reimbursement
56. Eg., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 749 (1981) (Louisiana tax on natural gas
"interfere[s] with the [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's] authority to regulate the
determination of the proper allocation of costs associated with the sale of natural gas to
customers"); see also Hirsch, supra note 19, at 527-28. See supra note 25 & accompanying
text.
57. See supra note 54 & accompanying text.
58. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
59. Id. at 664.
60. Id. at 664-65.
61. Id. at 665. The concept of community property is explained supra at note 33.
62. Id. at 665-66.
63. Id. at 669. (Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision).
64. Id. at 666-67.
65. Id. at 667-68.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 669.
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order would have had the practical effect of eliminating this induce-
ment.6 8 Thus, "the State [had] interfered directly with a legitimate ex-
ercise of the power of the Federal Government to borrow money. '69
Free demonstrates that the distinction between "irreconcilability"
and "interference" may not be significant for purposes of invoking pre-
emption.70 There may be, however, some significance in the nature of
the "conflict" itself. The Court appears unwilling to invoke preemp-
tion on a showing that interference is merely possible.7' Just as statu-
tory construction in an orthodox preemption analysis can be liberal or
strict, the requisite conflict or interference can be actual or potential.72
Moreover, just as strict construction may prevent preemption, so too
may an actual conflict requirement render resort to federal supremacy
unnecessary. 73
Wissner and Free demonstrate the use of orthodox preemption
analysis to determine the validity of state marital property laws in the
face of related federal legislation. They showcase the Court's conffict
preemption methodology: 1) the liberal or strict construction of the
objectives and scope of federal law along with a corresponding deter-
mination as to the operation of state law; and 2) the determination
68. Id.
69. Id. An important exception to federal preemption of state marital property law is
acknowledged in Free. "[R]elief would be available in a case where the circumstances mani-
fest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on the part of a husband while acting in
his capacity as manager of the general community property." Id. at 670.
70. In Free, the state court attempted to avoid the rigors of supremacy clause scrutiny
by complying with the express provisions of federal law. Indeed, the state court's award of
full title to the co-owner, on its face, satisfied Treasury regulations providing that a desig-
nated "co-owner. . . be recognized as the sole and absolute owner" of the bonds. See supra
notes 59-60 & accompanying text. The state court's reimbursement order, however, inter-
fered with the federal objective of inducing the purchase of savings bonds. See supra notes
67-70 & accompanying text. This interference was enough, under orthodox preemption
analysis, to invoke the supremacy clause. See supra notes 54-57 & accompanying text.
71. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), a preemption chal-
lenge was brought against a Maryland statute which required producers or refiners to extend
"voluntary allowances" to all retail service stations they supplied in the state. "Voluntary
allowances" were temporary price reductions granted by the suppliers to dealers facing local
competitive price reductions by competing retailers. The oil companies contended that the
state requirement should be preempted because it potentially conflicted with federal law
prohibiting price discrimination. The Supreme Court rejected this contention stating that
"hypothetical conflict is not sufficient to warrant pre-emption." Id. at 131.
72. Compare Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) ("intent [to preempt] is not to be
implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the
State") with San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,244 (1959) ("to allow
the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create poten-
tial frustration of national purposes").
73. "With a bit of imagination, most lawyers and judges can create a hypothetical set of
facts under which any two regulations touching the same general subject matter would con-
fict.. .. As the degree of unavoidable conflict required by the Court increases, it becomes
more likely that state regulation will be tolerated." Wiggins, supra note 5, at 44.
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whether state law actually or potentially prevents or hinders attainment
of the objectives attributable to valid congressional action.
Wissner, Free, and three more recent Supreme Court decisions
74
also demonstrate that orthodox preemption standards may be inappro-
priate where the challenged state law has been enacted to accomplish
goals different from federal law. Where the objectives of the state law
are unrelated to the objectives of federal law, as with state marital
property law and regulation of federal benefits, it may be more likely
that Congress has failed to assess the preemptive effect of the federal
legislation in question. 75 Thus, use of orthodox preemption doctrine in
the preceding context may result in unintended, unnecessary, 76 and un-
desirable77 shifts in the balance of federal and state regulatory power.
Contemporary Standards For Preemption of
Reconcilable State Law
In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo78 the Court began to formulate a spe-
cific preemption standard to resolve disputes involving the effect of
state marital property laws on federal benefit programs. Hisquierdo
and its progeny79 demonstrate that it may be undesirable in many in-
stances to invoke federal supremacy where the challenged state regula-
tion has been undertaken to accomplish goals unrelated to those
underlying particular federal laws.
The preemption issue in Hisquierdo arose after the California
Supreme Court held that Railroad Retirement Act (Act)80 benefits were
community property and thus divisible in a marriage dissolution pro-
ceeding.8 1 The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, concluded that fed-
eral law prevailed over state law on the issue of ownership of pension
benefits paid under the Act. 82
74. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
75. See Hirsch, supra note 19, at 542-48.
76. In contrast to orthodox preemption doctrine, the Court has recognized that a pre-
sumption favoring the validity of state law may be desirable in certain cases to avoid unin-
tended and unnecessary disturbances in the balance of federal and state regulatory power.
See infra note 109 & accompanying text.
77. Shifts in regulatory power may be undesirable where they further questionable fed-
eral interests at the expense of important state interests. See infra text accompanying notes
162-68.
78. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
79. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981).
80. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231u (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
81. In Re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1977).
82. 439 U.S. at 590.
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The Hisquierdo Court began its preemption analysis with two ob-
servations. First, the Court noted:
On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict
with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the
Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'posi-
tively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-
empted. . . .A mere conflict in words is not sufficient.8 3
Second, the Court stated that "[s]tate family and family-property law
must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests
before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overrid-
den."84 The Court then proceeded to frame a two-tier test for preemp-
tion in terms of 1) "whether the right as asserted conflicts with the
express terms of federal law . .." and 2) "whether its consequences
sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program to require
nonrecognition. ''8 5
In applying the first tier of the Hisquierdo test the Court found
several express conflicts between federal legislation governing pension
benefits and applicable state community property law.86 One such con-
flict involved a federal anti-attachment provision common to many
federal benefit schemes.8 7 The Court concluded that this anti-attach-
ment provision was designed to ensure that pension benefits "actually
reach the beneficiary. 88 Thus, the pensioner's wife's marital property
claim to a portion of the pensioner's retirement benefits conflicted with
the express terms of federal law.
83. Id. at 581.
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). It should be recog-
nized that Yazell did not involve either a conflict or occupation preemption challenge to
state law. In Yazel, Mr. and Mrs. Yazell obtained disaster loans from the Small Business
Administration. Upon default, the government attempted to execute a deficiency judgment
against Mrs. Yazell's separate property. Texas law at the time of the loan provided that
wives could not bind their separate property by contract unless the disability to contract had
been removed by court decree. The disability had not been removed when Mr. and Mrs.
Yazell signed for the loan. The issue before the Court, then, was "whether in connection
with an individualized, negotiated contract, the Federal Government may obtain a preferred
right which is notprovided by statute or specoc agency regulation, which was not a part of the
bargain, and which requires overriding a state law dealing with the intensely local interests
of family property and the protection (whether or not it is up-to-date or even welcome) of
married women." 382 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added). The Court held that the federal inter-
est in collecting the deficiency did not, in itself, override state law.
85. 439 U.S. at 583.
86. Id. at 583, 586-89.
87. 45 U.S.C. § 231m provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other law of the United
States, or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental
annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other
legal process under any circumstances whatsoever nor shall the payment thereof be antici-
pated . .. ."
88. 439 U.S. at 584.
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The dissent 89 more narrowly construed the relevant statutory lan-
guage and concluded that state law should not be preempted. Refer-
ring to the anti-attachment provision, the dissent did not perceive an
express conflict between federal law and the wife's community property
claim.90 Federal law provided that "no annuity or supplemental annu-
ity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, at-
tachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever,
nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated." 91 Because the wife
claimed to be a part owner in her husband's pension there could be no
"garnishment" or "attachment" inconsistent with federal law92 as those
terms govern remedies, not ownership rights. 93 Similarly, "[a] determi-
nation that a particular asset [was] community property [was] clearly
not an 'assignment' of that property from one spouse to another. 94
Furthermore, the prohibition against "anticipation" was also reconcila-
ble with a division of the pension as a community asset.95 A divorce
decree ordering the transfer of other community assets to the wife as an
offset for the value of her community property interest in the husband's
pension has no impact upon the timing of such payments.96 An award
of this nature is "not at all incompatible with the distribution system
established by Congress. '97
Having determined the existence of an "express conflict", the
Court examined whether the state law "sufficiently" injured the pur-
poses and objectives of the federal legislation. "Sufficient injury", pre-
sumably, requires "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal
interests.98
The Court was able to find the requisite injury using the second
tier of its preemption test. The purposes of the Act were clear: 1) to
provide older employees with an inducement to retire and 2) to assure
rapid advancement for younger employees. 99 It followed that "any au-
tomatic dimunition" of pension benefits by assertion of a community
property claim "discourag[ed] the divorced employee from retiring."1 °
California community property law provided the potential retiree with
an additional incentive to remain employed "because the former
spouse has no community property claim to salary earned after the
89. Id. at 591-603 (Justice Stewart joined by Justice Rehnquist).
90. Id. at 598-603.
91. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976).
92. 439 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. ld
94. Id. at 600.
95. Id. at 600-03.
96. Id. at 601-03.
97. Id. at 602.
98. Id. at 581; see supra note 84.
99. 439 U.S. at 573-74.
100. Id. at 585.
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marital community is dissolved." 1°
Hisquierdo established an unprecedented standard for preemption
disputes involving state marital property law. In deciding to apply a
different test, the Court may have been convinced that orthodox pre-
emption standards alone were unsuitable to determine the validity of
state regulation of marital property.10 2
The first tier of the Hisquierdo preemption test involves a determi-
nation of "whether the right as asserted conflicts with the express terms
of federal law."' 0 3 State domestic property law will not be preempted
unless Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that
state law be invalidated."°4 This first tier effectively requires applica-
tion of an orthodox "conffict" preemption methodology in determining
whether state law stands as a full or partial obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of federal objectives.
Whereas the first tier of the Hisquierdo test appears to be a mere
restatement of orthodox preemption doctrine, the test's second tier in-
jury requirement is clearly original.0 5 Why is "major damage" to
"clear and substantial" federal interests required? Would not a finding
of "conflict", "express" or otherwise, in the first tier of the test, auto-
matically invoke the principle of federal supremacy as in the case of
orthodox preemption analysis? Apparently, a small degree of "interfer-
ence", established in the first tier of the test, is not considered "suffi-
cient" to preempt state marital property law. Thus, it follows that state
marital property law causing only minimal interference with federal
objectives should be tolerated.
The Hisquierdo Court did not clarify its reasons for establishing a
new preemption test for disputes involving state marital property law.
Although the "sufficient injury" requirement does not originate from
preemption case law,'10 the creation of a new test to avoid preemption
is defensible on three grounds. First, the Court has rarely invoked pre-
emption to invalidate state marital property law.'07 Second, the Court
in prior decisions has recognized a presumption against preemption
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 106-10 & accompanying text.
103. 439 U.S. at 583.
104. Id. at 581.
105. The "major damage" to a "clear and substantial" federal interest requirement is
not recognized in any of the four preemption decisions prior to Hisquierdo involving state
marital property law. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
106. See supra note 84.
107. Prior to 1979, state laws regulating the division, succession or other disposition of
marital property had been invalidated by arguably conflicting federal legislation on only
four occasions. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
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when the state law regulates a matter of traditional state concern.10 8
This presumption, overcome only by an express congressional intent to
preeqipt, "assur[es] that 'the federal-state balance' . . . will not be dis-
turbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts."' 9
Finally, the Court may have been aware of the problems inherent in
applying orthodox preemption principles in determining the validity of
reconcilable state law, such as marital property law, enacted to accom-
plish goals unrelated to those underlying federal law. These problems
are examined more closely later in this Comment.' 10
The Hisquierdo Court, however, did not apply its new preemption
test in a manner which supported the presumptive validity of state mar-
ital property law. In finding that state law was preempted, the Court
did not signal a significant departure from orthodox preemption doc-
trine in state marital property law cases. For example, the Hisquierdo
Justices disagreed concerning whether the federal anti-attachment pro-
vision conflicted with a community property division of federal pension
benefits."' A similar disagreement as to the proper method of statu-
tory construction occurred in Wissner, l2 where, in accordance with or-
thodox preemption doctrine, "conflict" was in the eye of the beholder.
Moreover, as discussed below, the Hisquierdo Court loosely defined the
meaning of "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests
in applying the unique "sufficient injury" component of the test.
Undoubtedly there were railroad employees whose post-divorce
financial status would preclude them from retiring when first eligible.
Whether this group of eligible retirees would have a "major" impact on
personnel management goals is unclear.' 13 Furthermore, while the fed-
eral interest at stake may have been "clear", its "substantiality" was
never documented. 14 To conclude, without more, that a "substantial"
federal interest exists in inducing railroad employees to retire is to con-
108. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977).
109. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see also Kesler v. Department
of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (strictly construing the purposes of discharge provi-
sions of federal bankruptcy law to avoid preemption of State's exercise of policy power
requiring the suspension of a judgment debtor's driver's license until any outstanding auto-
mobile tort judgment was satisfied). But see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (consti-
tutional requirement of uniformity in the authorization to Congress to enact bankruptcy
legislation required construction of the purposes of federal bankruptcy law such that pre-
emption was found on facts similar to Kesler). See infra note 148 & accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 162-68 & accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 86-97 & accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 30-49 & accompanying text.
113. See infra note 115.
114. The Court in Hisquierdo does not cite any empirical evidence regarding the costs or
benefits which would inure to the federal government as a result of the prompt retirement of
railroad employees.
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cede that virtually any federal interest is substantial."15
Hisquierdo, then, illustrates that the subjective element inherent in
orthodox preemption analysis 16 remains. The dissent apparently con-
strued the new preemption requirements as mandating both strict con-
struction in dealing with the relevant statutes and a showing of
reasonable injury to "demonstrable federal policies."' 17 The majority's
interpretation of the new requirements, however, does not signal a shift
from orthodox preemption analysis.
Two years after Hisquierdo, in McCary v. McCarty, 1 8 the Court
held that the supremacy clause precluded application of California
community property law to divide military pension benefits in a mar-
riage dissolution proceeding. The Court first concluded that several
provisions of federal law, identical to some analyzed in Hisquierdo,
"conflicted" with state marital property law.1" 9 The Court then found
that federal interests in certain personnel management goals were "suf-
ficiently injured" by application of California community property
principles to the federal military retirement scheme. 120 Thus, the Court
115. Without any empirical evidence as to 1) the numbers of eligible retirees who might
defer retirement as a result of a community property division of their pension or 2) the
potential federal cost/benefit resulting from prompt, as opposed to delayed, retirement, any
determination as to the "substantiality" of the federal interest implicated in Hisquierdo was
purely conjecture. In the absence of a required showing of "substantiality," based on empir-
ical or related evidence, any reasonably identifiable federal interest may be transformed into
a "substantial" federal interest. In fact, the Court casts considerable doubt on whether there
could be "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests on the facts in His-
quierdo. As a result of the rapidly decreasing number of individuals employed in the rail-
road industry and the ever increasing number of pension beneficiaries, it is questionable
whether a substantial federal interest in encouraging retirement to create job opportunities
still exists if indeed it existed at the time Hisquierdo was decided. See 439 U.S. at 585 n.18.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 28-49.
117. 439 U.S. at 595 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
118. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
119. The Court found several instances in which state law conflicted with the express
terms of federal law. Under 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976), for example, a serviceman has the
right to direct, upon death, receipt of unpaid arrearages in retirement pay. The majority
concluded that this unfettered right to dispose of arrearages conflicted with a spouse's com-
munity property interest in the member spouse's retirement benefits. 453 U.S. at 225-26.
The dissent argued that such conflict established only that unpaid arrearages could not be
considered community property, noting that "[a] provision permitting a serviceman to tell
the Government where to mail his last paycheck after his death hardly supports the infer-
ence of a congressional intent to pre-empt state law governing disposition of military retired
pay in general." Id. at 244 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
As it had done two years earlier in Hisquierdo, the Court found a federal anti-attach-
ment provision inconsistent with a community property division of pension benefits. Id. at
228-30. The dissent once again refused to deviate from the plain language of the federal
law. Since the service member's spouse was not seeking to "attach" her husband's retire-
ment benefits, any "negative implication" of preemption from the anti-attachment provision
was not directly relevant. Id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. In applying the second tier of the Hisquierdo test, the majority examined the twin
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found that preemption was mandated through application of the His-
quierdo test.
Though Hisquierdo did not radically depart from orthodox pre-
emption analysis, its preemption requirements of "express conflict" and
"sufficient injury" potentially restricted the extension of federal
supremacy in the area of state marital property law. McCarty, how-
ever, interpreted the two Hisquierdo preemption requirements very lib-
erally. In determining the existence of an "express conffict", the Court
relied almost entirely on implied inconsistencies between state marital
property law and federal legislation. 2 1 Moreover, the Court based its
holding on a doubtful showing of injury to federal objectives. 22 By
speculating as to the nature and extent of injury to federal objectives,
the Court virtually eliminated the one aspect of the Hisquierdo preemp-
tion test that potentially distinguished it from orthodox preemption
doctrine.
goals of the military retirement program and concluded that "the community property divi-
sion of retired pay has the potential to frustrate each of [them]." Id. at 233 (emphasis ad-
ded).
First, "Congress had enacted a military retirement system ... to provide for the retired
service member." Id. at 232. Division of retired pay would injure federal objectives by
diminishing congressionally determined benefit levels. Id. at 233.
Second, the military retirement system was aimed at providing inducements for enlist-
ment and reenlistment while simultaneously encouraging older members to retire. Id. at
235. A community property division of retirement benefits injured the federal objective of
encouraging enlistment and reenlistment because potential recruits, faced with the possibil-
ity of being involuntarily stationed in a community property state, presumably would hesi-
tate to enlist or reenlist. Id. at 234-35. Furthermore, a community property division of
retirement benefits injured the federal objective of encouraging older servicemen to retire.
Because marital assets earned after separation under state law are deemed a spouse's sepa-
rate property, a serviceman would have an incentive to continue active service whenever his
retirement pay had been subjected to division pursuant to state community property law.
Id. at 235.
121. The dissenting Justices in McCarty were not convinced that state marital property
law and federal legislation were irreconcilable. See supra note 119.
122. As previously stated, military pension benefits, in addition to providing retirement
income, were designed to encourage enlistments while simultaneously providing older ser-
vicemen with an incentive to retire. See supra note 120. It is certainly arguable, however,
whether a significant number of servicemen and potential enlistees consider, in advance, the
possibility of divorce and the effects which various states' laws might have on their military
pensions. The absence of a sizable number of similarly knowledgeable servicemen would
commensurately reduce the disincentive to enlist and reenlist resulting from the continued
application of state marital property law.
More importantly, it is unclear whether the military retirement scheme's personnel
management goals constitute "substantial federal interests" in the first instance. According
to the McCarty Court, Congress was aware that the retirement scheme had been ineffective
in accomplishing personnel management goals. 453 U.S. at 234 n.26. Consequently, if im-
portant goals require effective measures for their attainment, then the personnel manage-
ment objectives were admittedly insignificant.
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In Ridgway v. Ridgway,' 23 decided four months after McCarty, the
Court exhibited a willingness to retreat even further from the unique
Hisquierdo preemption standard. In fact, the results reached in Ridg-
way illustrate that the Hisquierdo standard can now be used to uphold
unsubstantiated, and possibly insignificant, federal objectives at the ex-
pense of important state interests.
In Ridgway a serviceman, pursuant to a divorce settlement, agreed
to maintain his children as the beneficiaries of his Servicemen's Group
Life Insurance policy. The settlement was incorporated in the final di-
vorce decree by the state court. Four months later, the serviceman re-
married and changed the policy so that the proceeds would be paid to
his new wife. Nine months later the serviceman died.' 24
In a suit between the serviceman's widow and his children, the
state court imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the policy
for the benefit of the children.' 25 The state court concluded that the
federal statute did "not reflect any federal interest in permitting a ser-
viceman to evade the responsibility to provide for his minor children
imposed both by virtue of his voluntary agreement and by the express
provision of a valid state court decree." 126 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, in a 5-3 decision, held that the provisions of the Servicemen's
Group Life Insurance Act preempted the imposition of the constructive
trust and the state court decree on which it was based.
Significantly, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, did not
preface his analysis of the supremacy issue by restating the two-tier
Hisquierdo standard. Instead, he began by stating that "[w]hile state
family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests before . . . state law be overridden...
the relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when
there is a conflict with a valid federal law . .. 127 This statement
may have signaled a total retreat from the two-tier Hisquierdo standard
in favor of an orthodox preemption standard.
Hisquierdo had established two separate preemption requirements
recognizing the presumptive validity of state laws which regulate an
area of traditional state concern, such as marital property. Ridgway,
however, did not explicitly acknowledge the two separate Hisquierdo
preemption requirements. Instead, the Court simply stated that the
existence of perceived "conflict" will warrant preemption.1 2a This ap-
proach is identical to the orthodox approach taken by the Court earlier
123. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
124. Id. at 48-49.
125. Id. at 50.
126. Id. at 53-54.
127. Id. at 54 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581, and Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669
(1962)).
128. Id. at 55.
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in resolving state marital property preemption disputes. 29
The Ridgeway Court did not explicitly disapprove the Hisquierdo
approach. Rather, the Court cited the "sufficient injury" Hisquierdo
requirement,1 30 and then proceeded to resolve the preemption issues as
if it were utilizing the two-tier Hisquierdo standard. An examination of
the process by which the Court purportedly satisfied both Hisquierdo
requirements, however, illustrates that the Burger Court is now willing
to invoke federal preemption on the basis of orthodox preemption doc-
trine alone. 131 As will be discussed later in this Comment, orthodox
preemption analysis may be inappropriate to resolve preemption dis-
putes involving state marital property law.
The Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 (SGLIA) 32
at issue in Ridgway was the Vietnam era successor to the National
Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 (NSLIA). 133 Previously, the Wiss-
ner Court had utilized orthodox preemption methodology to find that
the NSLIA preempted state community property law on the issue of
ownership of insurance proceeds. 134 It is not surprising then that the
Court in Ridgway looked to Wissner for guidance in resolving the
supremacy issue. 135
First, Ridgway, like Wissner, involved a federal statute granting
the insured the right to designate and change the beneficiary of insur-
ance proceeds. 136 It followed that "Congress has spoken with force and
clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary
and no other."'137 Thus, the state court's treatment of the insurance
129. The Court in Ridgway cited Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) for the state-
ment that the existence of "conflict" invokes preemption despite the presence of important
state interests in the challenged regulation. 454 U.S. at 54-55. In Free, the Court applied
orthodox preemption doctrine to resolve the preemption dispute presented in that case. See
supra text accompanying notes 58-73.
130. 454 U.S. at 54.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-45.
132. 38 U.S.C. §§ 765-779 (1976).
133. Ch. 757, §§ 601-618, 54 Stat., 1008-14 (1940) (current version at 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-
726 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 30-49.
135. 454 U.S. at 55 ("The present case, we feel, is controlled by Wissner.").
136. Id. at 55-56. The two statutes, however, are by no means identical. The statute at
issue in Ridgway reads as follows: "Any amount of insurance ... in force on any member
• ..on the date of his death shall be paid ...to the beneficiary or beneficiaries as the
member . . . may have designated .... ." 38 U.S.C. § 770(a) (1976). Contrast § 770(a)
with the provision at issue in Wissner which reads as follows: "The insured shall have the
right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance. . . within [certain speci-
fied] classes of individuals. . . and shall. . . at all times have the right to change the benefi-
ciary or beneficiaries of such insurance without [their] consent ...." National Service Life
Insurance Act of 1940, ch. 757, § 601(g), 54 Stat. 1008, 1010 (1940) (current version at 38
U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976)). Section 601(g) is clearly a stronger statement of a serviceman's right
to designate the beneficiary of insurance proceeds than is § 770(a).
137. 454 U.S. at 56 (quoting Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658 (1950)).
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proceeds was "inconsistent" with this congressional directive.
Second, both cases involved "identical" anti-attachment clauses.138
Because federal law prohibited "attachment, levy or seizure" of insur-
ance payments, "[any diversion of the proceeds . . . by means of a
court-imposed constructive trust would therefore operate as a forbid-
den 'seizure' of those proceeds.'' 139
These apparent similarities make the Court's use of Wissner in
meeting the "express conflict" component of the Hisquierdo standard
defensible. The "express conflict" preemption requirement had been
satisfied in Hisquierdo and McCarty by a process resembling orthodox
preemption analysis.' 40 Because Wissner had been decided primarily
on orthodox "conflict" preemption grounds, 14' the Court's reliance on
Wissner to determine the existence of "express conflict" in Ridgeway
was at least consistent with the approaches taken in Hisquierdo and
McCarty.
The Court, however, also relied on Wissner to satisfy the "suffi-
cient injury" component of the Hisquierdo standard. 42 This reliance
was much less defensible. The Wissner Court, in holding that federal
legislation preempted state marital property law, applied an orthodox
preemption standard. 43 In contrast, the "sufficient injury" require-
ment was first introduced in Hisquierdo some 29 years after Wissner.144
Hisquierdo, in requiring "major damage" to "clear and substantial"
federal interests, apparently modified orthodox preemption doctrine to
reflect the presumptive validity of state regulation of marital
property. 45
Further, while McCarty may have modified the standard to re-
quire only "potential damage" to "identifiable federal objectives," the
Court there still had treated the "injury" requirement as meriting in-
dependent analysis.' 46 Wissner, however, neither acknowledged nor
decided the issue of whether state marital property law caused "major
138. Id. at 60.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 111-17, 119-22 & accompanying text.
141. The Ridgway Court stated that Wissner invoked the anti-attachment clause "as an
independent ground for the result reached in that case." 454 U.S. at 60. This "independent
ground," however, was simply an additional basis for finding "interference" such that state
marital property law could be invalidated under orthodox preemption analysis. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-50.
142. "Because the Court in Wissner . . . relied on similar provisions of the National
Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1008, in rejecting a claim to insurance proceeds
paid under that statute, the Court today concludes that WIissner is controlling and that it
must reach a similar result." 454 U.S. at 72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. See supra note 141 & accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 105-06 & accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 106-10 & accompanying text.
146. See supra note 120 & accompanying text.
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damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests. 147 Wissner ap-
plied only orthodox preemption analysis to determine the validity of
state law. Thus, the Court's summary reliance on Wissner to satisfy the
"sufficient injury" requirement in Ridgway indicated its willingness to
substitute orthodox preemption doctrine for the two-tier Hisquierdo
preemption standard.
There is reason, however, to question the Burger Court's retreat to
orthodox preemption standards in the area of state marital property
law. The use of orthodox preemption doctrine to resolve preemption
disputes involving state marital property law can result in unintended
shifts in state and federal regulatory power. This potential for misap-
plication of federal supremacy is evidenced by recent congressional ac-
tion reversing the holding in McCarty. 48 Apparently, Congress never
intended that the federal military retirement scheme preempt state
marital property laws.
Hisquierdo can be interpreted as the Court's attempt to avoid un-
intended preemption by devising an approach favoring the validity of
state marital property law in the face of reasonably reconcilable federal
legislation. If state law caused "major damage" to "clear and substan-
tial" federal interests then it would be much more likely that Congress,
by its action, intended to displace arguably conflicting state law. 1
49
Mistaken interpretation of congressional intent, however, is merely
symptomatic of the problem of applying orthodox preemption doctrine
to determine the validity of reconcilable state regulation enacted to ac-
complish objectives different from those underlying federal law. When
applying orthodox preemption analysis, "the relative importance to the
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
federal law."' 50 It is this refusal to balance state and federal interests
which makes orthodox preemption doctrine unsuitable to resolve pre-
emption disputes between reconcilable state law, such as state marital
property law, and federal law aimed at different objectives.
The importance of maintaining the presumptive validity of state
marital property law, either through a "sufficient injury" requirement
or by balancing state and federal interests, is made evident in Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion in Ridgway. Justice Stevens separately
identified the precise federal interests involved in both Wissner and
Ridgway. He concluded that neither the "interest in protecting feder-
147. See supra text accompanying notes 30-50.
148. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002
(1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408).
149. See supra text accompanying note 109.
150. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 54 (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. at 666). Free
employs orthodox preemption analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 58-76. There-
fore, the Court's express reluctance to acknowledge the important state interests at stake in
Ridgway was nothing more than a reiteration of orthodox preemption ideology.
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ally supported benefits from claims of the recipient's commercial credi-
tors" nor the "interest . . . in permitting a federal serviceman to
designate the beneficiary of his insurance policy" was sufficiently
"compromised" by the state court's ruling.15'
Justice Stevens further noted that the "federal interest incorpo-
rated within exemption statutes is an interest in preventing federally
supported benefits from satisfying claims of commercial creditors."'152
Wissner, however, did no more than place community property claims
"in the business category."' 53 Ridgway involved a claim based on a
"familial obligation" which may have been "precisely the type of claim
for which the federal benefit was intended."' 154 Relying on the "fam-
ily" versus "business" distinction, Justice Stevens was unconvinced
"that Congress intended . . . to bar a minor child's claim for
support."' 155
Justice Stevens also questioned whether there was a significant
federal interest in permitting servicemen to designate insurance benefi-
ciaries. The Court in Wissner had "speculated" that this right to direct
insurance proceeds was designed to "enhance the morale of the service-
man." 56 Surely military "morale" did not hinge on the serviceman's
ability to evade freely negotiated support settlements. 57 Most impor-
tantly, however, a serious potential for inequity lurked beneath the ma-
jority's rationale:
[A] loan shark, a camp follower, or a total stranger designated as
beneficiary would have priority over claims of dependent family
members, even though those claims were incorporated in a voluntary
settlement areement and an express judicial decree .... No fed-
eral interest justifies such an absolute and unqualified priority for the
designated beneficiary.' 58
This conclusion on the part of Justice Stevens exposes the inequity
resulting from the use of orthodox preemption analysis to determine
the validity of reconcilable state regulation undertaken to accomplish
objectives different from those underlying federal law. Conflicting fed-
eral legislation can be enacted without any consideration of its preemp-
tive capabilities. Congress may not be cognizant that largely unrelated
state law may be completely invalidated by the routine enactment of
federal legislation.159 The "all-or-nothing" nature of orthodox pre-
151. 454 U.S. at 72-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 78-79.
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id. at 79.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 80 (quoting Wissner v. Wissner, 388 U.S. 655, 660 (1950)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 81.
159. This apparently occurred with respect to the federal legislation at issue in McCary.
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emption doctrine can, therefore, result in unintended shifts in the bal-
ance of regulatory power within our federal system.160
The Hisquierdo test, with its "sufficient injury" requirement, pro-
vides some assurance that congressional intent will not be misread.161
Ridgway, however, demonstrates that the Court is unwilling to apply
the "sufficient injury" requirement in a manner supporting the validity
of state law. Unfortunately, the problems created by the Burger
Court's shift to orthodox preemption standards as a basis for determin-
ing the validity of state marital property law remain. Consequently,
the following discussion examines an alternative standard designed to
meet the problems inherent in resolving preemption disputes between
state and unrelated federal legislation.
Balancing State and Federal Interests To Determine Whether
Reconcilable State Law is Preempted By Unrelated
Federal Law
As previously discussed, sound reasons exist for doubting the
Court's wisdom with respect to the treatment of alleged conflicts be-
tween congressional action and state regulation of marital property.
Such disputes involve laws aimed at largely unrelated objectives.162
When the aims of two regulatory schemes are different it can be ex-
pected that the policy considerations underlying each scheme will also
be different. Ascertaining congressional intent with respect to preemp-
tion can be very imprecise in cases where it is likely that Congress
failed to consider the policy considerations supporting state law. Inval-
idating unrelated state law on the basis of orthodox preemption doc-
trine, with its sole focus on the existence of possible interference with
federal objectives, gives rise to the possibility that important policy
considerations underlying state law will be entirely ignored.
Ridgway illustrates the type of policy considerations which may go
unweighed by an application of orthodox preemption doctrine to re-
solve preemption disputes involving state marital property law. For
instance, the majority in Ridgway interpreted federal law as "directing
that the proceeds [of military insurance] belong to the named benefici-
ary and no other."' 63 The federal objective in establishing a service-
160. See supra notes 75-77, 148 & accompanying text. See also Hirsch, supra note 19, at
542-48.
161. See supra note 120 & accompanying text.
162. For example, in Ridgway, the Court found that the federal law was designed to
"enhance the morale of servicemen." See supra text accompanying notes 156-58. State
marital property laws are designed to effectuate an equitable property division upon divorce.
See infra note 166.
163. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 56 (quoting Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658
(1950)).
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man's right to designate insurance beneficiaries apparently was to
"enhance the morale of the serviceman."164 If the purpose of particular
congressional action is to devise methods which will enhance the mo-
rale of servicemen, then presumably Congress has weighed certain pol-
icy considerations in deciding that the creation of a right to designate
freely the recipient of insurance proceeds is the most desirable method
by which to achieve its goal. With respect to the federal law at issue in
Ridgway, an important policy consideration was to solve existing flaws
in the military benefits program which failed to allow a serviceman to
compensate persons to whom he may have felt he owed some survivor-
ship protection. 165 This is typical of a policy consideration which
would be weighed against other policy considerations, such as the cost
of administering the program, when deciding whether to establish a
right to designate insurance beneficiaries for the purpose of enhancing
military morale.
In contrast, the state regulation at issue in Ridgway involved com-
pletely different policy considerations. 166 Most importantly, state laws
designed to enforce marital support obligations presumably take into
account the ability of the parties to earn income, the standard of living
to which the parties are accustomed, and the ability of the state to pro-
vide the necessary income in lieu of support from other sources. 167 It is
doubtful whether Congress considered any of these policy considera-
tions when passing legislation designed to enhance the morale of ser-
vicemen. Under orthodox preemption doctrine, a state marital
property law which "conflicts" with Congress' attempt to enhance the
morale of servicemen would be invalidated without either the Court or
Congress having first considered the policy considerations underlying
the state regulation.
In contrast to the orthodox preemption approach utilized in ]Ridg-
way, the Court, in determining whether a state marital property law
should be preempted, could balance the relevant state and federal in-
terests involved whenever the state law is reasonably reconcilable with
federal law.168 Specifically, the Court could balance the state's interest
in regulating the subject matter at issue with the federal interest in re-
164. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. H.R. REP. No. 1103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (statement of W.J. Driver, Admin-
istrator of Veterans' Affairs, Sept. 9, 1965).
166. "[Ihe policy of community property was to establish equality between husband
and wife in the area of property rights in marital property acquisitions, in recognition of and
to give effect to the fundamental equality between the spouses based on the separate identity
of each spouse and the actual contribution that each made to the success of the marriage."
W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNrrY PROPERTY 24 (2nd ed. 1971).
167. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1983).
168. Some commentators have suggested such an approach. See, e.g., J. NOwAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YoUNo, HANDBOOK'ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268 (1978); Hirsch, supra
note 19, at 537-38.
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maining free from the potential interference posed by the particular
state regulation. Again, using Ridgway as an example, it can be seen
that this balancing approach can overcome the problems which result
from the application of orthodox preemption doctrine to resolve dis-
putes involving state marital property law.
In determining the weight to be given the state's interest in impos-
ing a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds for the benefit of the
serviceman's children, the Court in Ridgway could have taken into ac-
count such policy considerations as the ability of similarly situated par-
ties to earn a living and the ability of the state to provide essential
income should the need arise. If the state's interests, based on these
and other similar considerations, did not outweigh the federal interest
in the improvement of military morale through the establishment of
absolute beneficiary designation rights, the Court should have con-
cluded that state law was preempted. If, however, the state interest did
outweigh the federal interest, the Court could have reasonably con-
cluded that Congress did not intend that state law be preempted. The
Court could have then adopted the reasonable interpretation of federal
law which resulted in reconciliation between the state and federal stat-
utory schemes. Under this approach, where state and federal laws are
enacted with unrelated objectives in mind, there would be adequate
assurances that important policy considerations have been weighed
before state law is preempted.
It should be noted that the preemption standard developed by the
Court in Hisquierdo, and subsequently applied in McCarty and Ridg-
way, cannot adequately assure that important policy considerations
will be examined when state marital property law is preempted. The
Court's failure to require "major damage" to "clear and substantial"
federal interests before state law is overridden has removed the mecha-
nism by which policy considerations may be assessed under the His-
quierdo standard. 169 As was demonstrated in the examination of the
respective positions of the majority and dissenting Justices in His-
quierdo, McCarty and Ridgway, preemption of state marital property
law by largely unrelated federal law rests solely on a process of statu-
tory interpretation. Though the state and federal laws at issue in those
cases were reconcilable, the Court was compelled to invoke the
supremacy clause under the mandate of orthodox preemption doctrine.
Thus, until the Court undertakes to balance the state's interest in regu-
lating the subject matter at issue with the federal interest in remaining
free from the potential interference posed by reasonably reconcilable
state regulation, important policy considerations will go unweighed in
the determination of whether state regulation should be invalidated.
169. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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Conclusion
There can be no doubt that state law which is completely irrecon-
cilable with valid federal legislation is preempted pursuant to the
supremacy clause. Preemption disputes involving state marital prop-
erty law, however, fall, for the most part, outside the area of
irreconcilability.
The issue before the Court, then, is whether the process of statu-
tory reconciliation should be undertaken. The Court, however, appears
unwilling to recognize a presumption favoring the validity of reconcila-
ble state law such as state marital property law. 170 Instead, under or-
thodox preemption doctrine, preemption will be mandated whenever
state law conflicts with the implied terms of federal law or potentially
inhibits the attainment of some identifiable statutory goal.'
7
'
Unfortunately, the application of orthodox preemption doctrine to
resolve preemption disputes between federal law and unrelated yet rec-
oncilable state law may lead to unintended shifts in the balance of fed-
eral and state regulatory power. Moreover, the application of orthodox
preemption doctrine to these disputes gives rise to the possibility that
important policy considerations will be overlooked in deciding whether
state marital property law should be invalidated.
Fortunately, the Court need not utilize orthodox preemption anal-
ysis, or its effective equivalent, the two-tier Hisquierdo standard, in de-
ciding whether reasonably reconcilable state marital property law is
preempted by largely unrelated federal legislation. An appropriate so-
lution would be to balance the state's interest in regulating the common
subject matter with the federal interest in remaining free from the po-
tential interference which upholding state marital property law would
entail. Until such an approach is adopted, however, the Court will
continue to make important decisions regarding the relative spheres of
state and federal regulation without adequate assurances that impor-
tant policy considerations have been weighed in the line-drawing
process.
James A. Riddle*
170. See supra text accompanying notes 140-47.
171. See supra notes 121-27 & accompanying text.
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